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Abstract
We examine stability of competitive equilibrium in an N-country
world economy with capital accumulation, where each country can
have either increasing marginal impatience (IMI) or decreasing mar-
ginal impatience (DMI). The necessary and su¢ cient condition for
stability is shown as positive deniteness of a simple matrix. The con-
dition requires that any positive perturbation in one countrys wealth,
adjusted for international spill-over e¤ects on other countrys savings,
reduces the countrys wealth accumulation. In the presence of a DMI
country, the number of countries should be su¢ ciently small for stabil-
ity. Particularly, the existence of two or more than two DMI countries
implies instablility.
Keywords: Stability, decreasing marginal impatience, N-country econ-
omy.
JEL classication: F41, F32, E00.
Corresponding author. The Faculty of Commerce, Otaru University of Commerce,
3-5-21 Midori, Otaru, Hokkaido 047-8501, Japan. Telephone: +81(134)27-5365. E-mail:
hirose@res.otaru-uc.ac.jp
yThe Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, 6-1 Mihogaoka,
Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan. Telephone: +81(6)6879-8568. Fax: +81(6)6879-8583.
E-mail: ikeda@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp
1 Introduction
It is important to work out how endogenous time preference formation a¤ects
dynamic properties such as stability of competitive equilibrium. It is because
economists needs to know what kinds of consumer preferences are compatible
with dynamically well behaved models.
The purpose of this paper is to show the local stability conditions of
competitive equilibrium in an N-country world economy with endogenous
time preferences, and thereby elucidate its economic implications.
When the degree of impatience, measured by the pure rate of time pref-
erence, is marginally decreasing in wealth, the wealthier are more patient
and, ceteris paribus, become even wealthier over time, implying that de-
creasing marginal impatience (hereafter DMI) is destabilizing in itself. To
ensure stability, therefore, increasing marginal impatience (hereafter IMI)
has been assumed (e.g., Epstein, 1987a, b; Lucas and Stokey, 1984; Obst-
feld, 1990; Ikeda, 2006). However, in general equilibrium, DMI is compatible
with dynamic stability. Das (2003) and Hirose and Ikeda (2008) verify that
a neo-classical production economy can be stable under even DMI. But, the
analyses are limited to the closed economy setting. Our main interest is to
elucidate the stability condition of a global economy with capital accumula-
tion under country heterogeneity in terms of time preferences.
We show the necessary and su¢ cient condition for stability in the form
of positive deniteness of a simple matrix. The resulting principal minor
conditions require that any positive perturbation in one countrys wealth,
adjusted for international spill-over e¤ects on other countrys savings, leads
to a decrease in the countrys saving and hence its wealth accumulation. The
result implies that, in the presence of a DMI country, the number of countries
should be small enough for the interdependent world economy to be stable.
2 The model
Suppose that the world economy is composed ofN countries 1;    ; N , each of
which is populated with the same number of innitely-lived identical house-
holds. Without loss of generality, the population is assumed to be one. A
single type of goods, which can be either consumed or invested and is trade-
able across countries, is produced by competitive rms in both countries
using constant-returns-to-scale technologies with capital and labor. Equities
1
representing claims to the capital stock are traded in a perfect international
nancial market. In each country, one unit of labor is supplied inelastically
by the representative household.
2.1 Households
The budget constraints for the representative households in country i (i =
1;    ; N) are given by
_ai = rai + wi   ci; (1)
where ai denote the asset holdings, ci consumption, wi the labor wage, and
r the interest rate; and a dot represents the time derivative.
We specify the preferences by assuming variable time preferences as
max
Z 1
0
ui
 
ci (t)

exp( i (t))dt; (2)
where ui (ci) (i = 1;    ; N) represent the instantaneous utility functions;
and i denote cumulative discount rates with instantaneous discount rates
i (ci): i (t) =
R t
0
i (ci ())d , or
_i (t) = i
 
ci (t)

;i (0) = 0: (3)
For the intertemporal preferences to be well-dened, we follow the litera-
ture (e.g., Epstein, 1987a; Obstfeld 1990; Hirose and Ikeda, 2008) in assum-
ing that the following standard regularity conditions are valid: (C1) ui < 0
(i = 1; 2); (C2) ui are strictly increasing and strictly concave in ci; (C3)  ui
are log-convex in ci; and (C4) i are concave in ci. It is known, and will
be shown later, that the degree of impatience, measured by the rate of
time preference, is marginally increasing or decreasing in wealth as the dis-
count rate i is increasing or decreasing in ci. Since the regularity conditions,
(C1)-(C4), are not related to the signs of the rst derivatives of i (hereafter
di=dci is expressed as ic, and so on), the degree of impatience can be either
marginally increasing or decreasing under the conditions.
The rst-order conditions to maximize lifetime utility function (2) are
summarized as1
_ci = i
 
ci; i
  
r   i  ci; i ; (4)
1For details, see Hirose and Ikeda (2008, 2012a, 2012b).
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_
i
=  i  ci; i ; (5)
where i(t) represents the lifetime utility obtained from the optimal con-
sumption stream after time t, the generating functionsi are dened by
i
 
ci; i

= ui
 
ci
  ii  ci ; (6)
the rates of time preference i are computed as
i
 
ci; i

= i
 
ci
  i  ci; i
ic
 
ci; i
ic  ci ; (7)
and i =  ic=icc > 0 when the marginal utility of ci (ic) is assumed to be
positive.2
From (7), i = 
i
c(
i=ic) around the steady state point in which 
i = 0
(see (5)). This implies that the degree of impatience, measured by i, is
marginally increasing or decreasing in the utility index i as ic is positive
or negative. We refer to consumer preferences as increasing marginal impa-
tience (IMI) when ic and hence 
i
 are positive, and as decreasing marginal
impatience (DMI) when ic and hence 
i
 are negative.
2.2 Firms
Let ki and yi (i = 1;    ; N) denote the capital stock and output in country
i, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that all countries have the same
per capita production function:
yi = f(ki); (8)
satisfying fk > 0, fkk < 0. As the results of prot maximization by rms,
supposing that there is no capital depreciation and no adjustment cost of
investment, we obtain
fk(k
i) = r and f(ki)  fk(ki)ki = wi: (9)
2In the following analyses, we assume away a possibility of satiation (ic 5 0) which
may occur under decreasing marginal impatience (ic < 0). See Hirose and Ikeda (2008)
for the implications of the satiated utility of decreasing marginal impatience consumers.
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By denoting the world total capital stock K 
NP
i=1
ki, ki =
K
N
(i = 1;    ; N)
and the interest rate r can be expressed as a function of K:
r = (K); where K(K) =
fkk(
K
N
)
N
< 0: (10)
2.3 The market equilibrium
The market-clearing conditions are given by
NP
i=1
ci + _K =
NP
i=1
yi and
NP
i=1
ai = K: (11)
From (1), (4), (5), (9), (10), and (11), we can derive the reduced dynamic
system as follows:
_ci = i
 
ci; i
  
(K)  i  ci; i (i = 1;    ; N); (12)
_
i
= i
 
ci

i   ui  ci (i = 1;    ; N); (13)
_K = Nf

K
N

 
NP
i=1
ci; (14)
_ai = f

K
N

+ (K)

ai   K
N

  ci (i = 1;    ; N   1): (15)
This dynamic system has N pre-determined state variables, K and ai (i =
1;    ; N   1).
2.4 The steady-state equilibrium
From (12) through (15), the steady-state equilibrium is determined by the
following equations:
i
 
ci

= (K) = r (i = 1;    ; N); (16)
NP
i=1
ci = Nf

K
N

; (17)
i = ui
 
ci

=r (i = 1;    ; N); (18)
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ai =
K
N
+
ci   f  K
N

r
(i = 1;    ; N); (19)
where an asterisk denotes the steady-state value. The values of ci (i =
1;    ; N); K and r are jointly determined from (16) and (17). Then, i
are determined from (18) and ai from (19).
3 Time Preference and Stability
By linearizing the dynamic system composed of (12) to (15) around the
steady state, we obtain0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
_c1
...
_cN
_
1
...
_
N
_K
_a1
...
_aN 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
=M
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
c1   c1
...
cN   cN
1   1
...
N   N
K  K
a1   a1
...
aN 1   aN 1
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
; (20)
where the coe¢ cient matrix is evaluated at the steady state; andM is dened
by
M =
0@ ONN M1 ON(N 1)M2 rIN+1 O(N+1)(N 1)
M3 M4 rIN 1
1A ;
with Mi (i = 1; 2; 3; 4) being given by
M1 =
0B@  r
1
c
1=1c 0 K
1
. . .
...
0  rNc N=Nc KN
1CA ;
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M2 =
0BBB@
 1c 0
. . .
0  Nc
 1     1
1CCCA ;
M3 =
  IN 1 O(N 1)1 ; and M4 =
0B@O(N 1)N K(a
1   K
N
)
...
K(a
N 1   K
N
)
1CA :
Since this dynamic system has N pre-determined state variables, the
steady-state equilibrium is locally saddle-point stable if and only if coe¢ -
cient matrix M has N negative eigenvalues. As proved in Appendix A, we
thus obtain the following property.3
Proposition 1: The steady-state equilibrium is locally saddle-point stable
if and only if
Q =
0BBBBBB@
r1c   K  K        K
 K r2c   K . . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . . rN 1c   K  K
 K        K rNc   K
1CCCCCCA
is positive denite, i.e., the principal minors of Q are all positive:
 the 1st principal minor condition
ric   K > 0 8 i
 the 2nd principal minor condition ric   K  K K rjc   K
 > 0 for 8(i; j); i 6= j
...
 the Nth principal minor condition
3These stability conditions are consistent with the Appendix of Epstein (1987a).
6
jQj > 0
Interpretation of Proposition 1
The rst principal condition requires that a positive perturbation in ar-
bitrary country is wealth leads to a decrease in the countrys savings and
hence wealth accumulation. The condition is the same as the saddle-point
condition that is obtained using closed economy models (e.g., Das (2003),
Hirose and Ikeda (2008)).
The second principal minor condition for countries i and j, (ric K)(rjc 
K) (K)2 > 0, is a stability condition in which spill-over e¤ects of a pertur-
bation is incorporated. Consider a positive perturbation ai with its e¤ect
on country js savings being nullied by adding cancelling perturbation on
aj satisfying  Kai + (rjc   K)aj = 0. The perturbation ai which is
augmented in this way by the consideration of the spill-over e¤ects a¤ects
country is savings directly by (ric   K) and indirectly by  K through
the induced perturbation aj = fK=(rjc   K)gai. The principal minor
condition requires that the sum of the two e¤ects be negative.
Similarly, the nth (n = 3;    ; N) principal minor condition requires that
the augmented perturbation ai, with its e¤ects on the other countries
savings being all nullied, decreases country is savings and hence its wealth
accumulation.
The second principal minor condition in proposition 1 implies that the
number of the DMI countries is required to be smaller than two for stability:
Proposition 2: If two or more than two countries have DMI, the steady-
state equilibrium is unstable.
The existence of two or more than two DMI countries contradicts stability,
because the second principal minor condition is violated due to destabilizing
spill-over e¤ects. To explain this, consider two DMI countries i and j which
satisfy the rst principal minor conditions ric   K > 0 and rjc   K > 0.
Under the conditions, the second principal minor condition is violated: an
augmented positive perturbation on country is wealth ai with its e¤ects on
the country js saving being nullied byaj necessarily increases the country
is saving and its wealth accumulation _ai. Therefore, The existence of two
or more than two DMI countries implies instability. For the interdependent
world economy to be stable, the number of the DMI countries should be less
than two.
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As shown by the literature (e.g., Das, 2003; Hirose and Ikeda, 2008),
a closed economy populated with a DMI representative consumer can be
stable. Proposition 2 implies that when it is populated with heterogenous
DMI consumers, it necessarily destabilizes the economy. This is because
wealth-distribution dynamics among heterogenous DMI consumers cannot
be stable. For example, suppose that the economy is initially in steady-state
equilibrium and consider a wealth transfer from DMI consumer (or country) j
to DMI consumer (or country) i, whereai > 0;aj < 0;an = 0 (n 6= i; j),
and K = 0. By construction, it lowers country is time preference (i.e.,
i < 0) and raises country js (j > 0) with leaving r unchanged. This
leads to unstable process of further accumulation of ai and decumulation of
aj.
Note that, even when there is only one DMI country in the world econ-
omy, the stability condition is necessarily violated when the number of IMI
countries is large enough, because an innitely large N makes K(= fkk=N)
zero and thereby violates the rst principal minor condition for the DMI
country.
Proposition 3: When the world economy contains a DMI country, the
number of countries should be small enough for stability.
To be rough, the larger the number of countries is, the more restrictive
is the stability condition, because the stability of an (N +1)-country system
apparently requires that each of the constituentN -country systems be stable.
In this sense, an increase in the number of countries tends to destabilize the
world economy.
To show this property, let us assume that ic (i = 1;    ; N+1) and fkk are
constant and compare the stability conditions between an N -country system
and an (N + 1)-country system composed of the original N countries plus a
new (N+1)th country. Then, the stability of the augmented (N+1)-country
system requires stronger conditions than the original N -country system for
the following reasons. First, an increase in the number of countries reduces
K , the principal minor conditions in Proposition 1 for countries 1;    ; N are
more restrictive in the augmented (N+1)-country system than in the original
N -country system. Second, the principal minor conditions in Proposition 1
for country (N +1) are added as extra burdens to the stability conditions in
the augmented (N + 1)-country system.
These discussions can be summarized as follows:
8
Proposition 4: Suppose that the world economy contains a DMI country,
and that ic (i = 1;    ; N + 1) and fkk are constant. Then, an increase in
the number of countries, either IMI or DMI, destabilizes the world economy.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines stability of competitive equilibrium in an N-country
world economy with capital accumulation, where each countrys represen-
tative consumer can have either IMI or DMI. The necessary and su¢ cient
condition for local saddle-path stability of the steady-state equilibrium is
obtained in terms of positive deniteness of a simple matrix. The result-
ing principal minor conditions require that any positive perturbation in one
countrys wealth, adjusted for international spill-over e¤ects on other coun-
trys savings, leads to a decrease in the countrys saving and hence its wealth
accumulation. An important corollary is that, in the presence of a DMI coun-
try, the number of interdependent countries should be su¢ ciently small for
stability. Particularly, the existence of two or more than two DMI countries
implies instability. As an implication, for a free-trade area to be stable, the
number of constituent countries should not be overly large.
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Appendix A: The proof of Proposition 1
Let
M0 =

ONN M1
M2 rIN+1

;
and
P =M0(rI2N+1  M0) =

P1 ON(N+1)
O(N+1)N P2

;
where
P1 =  M1M2
=
0BBBBBB@
(K   r1c)1 K1       K1
K
2 (K   r2c)2 . . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . . (K   rN 1c )N 1 KN 1
K
N       KN (K   rNc )N
1CCCCCCA ;
P2 =  M2M1
=
0BBB@
 r1c1 O 1cK1
. . .
...
O  rNc N Nc KN
 r1c1=1c     rNc N=Nc KNi=1i
1CCCA :
Lemma A.1: r is an eigenvalue of M0.
Proof : jrI2N+1  M0j =
 rIN  M1 M2 O(N+1)(N+1)

= jrIN j
O(N+1)(N+1)   ( M2)(rIN) 1( M1) = jrIN j 1r ( ANAN)
= 1
r
jP2j = 0, since P2 is singular.
Lemma A.2: If  is an eigenvalue of M0, (r   ) is an eigenvalue of P .
Therefore, if  is an eigenvalue of P , at least either 1
2
(r +
p
r2   4) or
1
2
(r  
p
r2   4) is an eigenvalue of M0.
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Proof : Let  = diag(1;    ; N), V = (v1;    ; vN), where i (i = 1;    ; N)
denote the eigenvalues of M0, and vi (i = 1;    ; N) the eigenvector corre-
sponding to i, that is, M0V = V , V  1M0V = ,M0 = V V  1.
Then, P =M0(rI2N+1 M0) = V V  1(rI2N+1 V V  1) = V (r)V  1 
V 2V  1 = V f(rI   )gV  1, and hence V  1PV = (rI2N+1   ) =
diag(1(r   1);    ; N(r   N)):
Lemma A.3: The eigenvalues of P1 and 0 are the eigenvalues of P2.
Proof : Let 1 =
0BBB@
1=1c O
. . .
1=nc
O 1
1CCCA ; 2 =
0BBB@
1c O
. . .
nc
O 1
1CCCA ;
3 =
0BBB@
1 O 0
. . .
...
O 1 0
 1     1 1
1CCCA ; 4 =
0BBB@
1 O 0
. . .
...
O 1 0
1    1 1
1CCCA. Then,
jIN+1   P2j =

+ r1c
1 O  1cK1
. . .
...
O + rnc
n  nc Kn
r1c
1=1c    rncn=nc   KNi=1i

=
1
0BBB@
+ r1c
1 O  1cK1
. . .
...
O + rnc
n  nc Kn
r1c
1=1c    rncn=nc   KNi=1i
1CCCA2

(* j1j j2j = 1)
=

+ r1c
1 O  K1
. . .
...
O + rnc
n  Kn
r1c
1    rncn   KNi=1i

=
3
0BBB@
+ r1c
1 O  K1
. . .
...
O + rnc
n  Kn
r1c
1    rncn   KNi=1i
1CCCA4

(* j3j = j4j = 1)
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=
(r1c   K)1  K1        K1  K1
 K2 (r2c   K)2 . . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . . (rn 1c   K)n 1  Kn 1
...
 Kn        Kn (rnc   K)n  Kn
0          0 

= 

(r1c   K)1  K1        K1
 K2 (r2c   K)2 . . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . . (rn 1c   K)n 1  Kn 1
 Kn        Kn (rnc   K)n

=  jIN  M1j :
Lemma A.4: If  is an eigenvalue of M0 satisfying that (r   ) is an eigen-
value of P1, r    is also an eigenvalue of M0.
Proof : Let
0B@ 1...
N
1CA is the eigenvector of P1 corresponding to the (r   ).
Then, the eigenvector of M0 corresponding to  is given by0BBBBBBBBB@
(r   )1
...
(r   )N
1c1
...
nc N
Ni=1i
1CCCCCCCCCA
;
that is
A
0BBBBBBBBB@
(r   )1
...
(r   )N
1c1
...
nc N
Ni=1i
1CCCCCCCCCA
= 
0BBBBBBBBB@
(r   )1
...
(r   )N
1c1
...
nc N
Ni=1i
1CCCCCCCCCA
:
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Therefore,
A
0BBBBBBBBB@
1
...
N
1c1
...
nc N
Ni=1i
1CCCCCCCCCA
= (r   )
0BBBBBBBBB@
1
...
N
1c1
...
nc N
Ni=1i
1CCCCCCCCCA
;
implying that r    is also an eigenvalue of M0.
From Lemmas A.1-A.4, we obtain lemma A.5.
Lemma A.5: Letting i (i = 1;    ; N) be the eigenvector of P1, the eigen-
values of M0 are 12(r +
p
r2   4i)(> 0), 12(r  
p
r2   4i) (i = 1;    ; N),
and r.
Noting that 1
2
(r pr2   4i) < 0(= 0) for i < 0(= 0), we obtain lemma
A.6.
Lemma A.6: M0 (and hence M) have N negative eigenvalues if and only if
eigenvalues of P1 are all negative.
Let D = diag(1;    ; n) and
Q =
0BBBBBB@
r1c   K  K        K
 K r2c   K . . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . . rN 1c   K  K
 K        K rNc   K
1CCCCCCA .
Then, P1 =  DQ, and we obtain lemma A.7.
Lemma A.7: All eigenvalues of P1 are negative if and only if Q is positive
denite.
Proof : All eigenvalues of P1(=  DQ) are negative:
U 1( DQ)U = diag(1;    ; N) where i < 0 8i
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, All eigenvalues of  D1=2QD1=2 are negative:
(D 1=2U) 1( D1=2QD1=2)(D 1=2U) = diag(1;    ; N)
,  D1=2QD1=2 is negative denite: z0( D1=2QD1=2)z < 0 8z 6= 0
, Q is positive denite: x0Qx > 0 8x 6= 0 (by letting x = D1=2z)
From Lemmas A.6 and A.7, we obtain Proposition 1.
Appendix B: The interpretation of Proposition
1
For simplicity of notation, we consider the interpretation of the leading
principal minor conditions in this appendix. Let ~Q(n) (n = 1;    ; N) denote
the nth order leading principal submatrix of Q.
A perturbation (a1;    ;an) changes i (i = 1;    ; N) and r approx-
imately as
i =
ric
ic
i =
ric
ic

ic
r
ci

= ic(ra
i) = rica
i;
r = KK = K(
N
i=1a
i):
When i   r > 0 (< 0), it leads to a decrease (an increase) in the
country is savings.
 The interpretation of the rst order leading principal minor condition: ~Q(1) = r1c   K > 0
For a perturbation (a1; 0;    ; 0) with a1 > 0;
1  r = (r1c   K)a1 =
 ~Q(1)a1 > 0
This implies that the perturbation leads to a decrease in the country 1s
savings.
 The interpretation of the nth (n = 2;    ; N) order leading principal
minor condition:
 ~Q(n) > 0
From ~Q(n) =

~Q(n 1)  (n 1)
 0(n 1) r
n
c   K

; where  (n 1) =
0B@  K...
 K
1CA ;
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 ~Q(n) =  ~Q(n 1) f(rnc   K)   0(n 1) ~Q  1(n 1) (n 1)g:
Supposing that the (n   1)th order leading principal minor condition ~Q(n 1) > 0 is valid,
nth order leading principal minor condition:
 ~Q(n) > 0 , (rnc   K) 
 0(n 1) ~Q
 1
(n 1) (n 1) > 0
Then, for a perturbation (a1;    ;an; 0;    ; 0) with an > 0 whose
e¤ect on savings of countries 1;    ; n  1 being nullied as0B@ 
1  r
...
n 1  r
1CA = ~Q(n 1)
0B@ a
1
...
an 1
1CA+  (n 1)an =
0B@ 0...
0
1CA ;
i.e.,
0B@ a
1
...
an 1
1CA =   ~Q  1(n 1) (n 1)an;
n  r =    0(n 1) rnc   K  0(N n) 
0BBBBBBBBB@
a1
...
an 1
an
0
...
0
1CCCCCCCCCA
=  0
0B@ a
1
...
an 1
1CA+ (rnc   K)an
= f(rnc   K)   0(n 1) ~Q  1(n 1) (n 1)gan > 0:
This implies that the perturbation leads to a decrease in the country ns
savings.
 The interpretation of positive deniteness
Q is positive denite , x0Qx > 0; 8x 6= 0
By letting x = (a1;    ;aN)0;
x0Qx = (a1;    ;aN)
0B@ r
1
ca
1   KK
...
rNc a
N   KK
1CA = (a1;    ;aN)
0B@ 
1  r
...
N  r
1CA :
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Thus, Q is positive denite,
NP
i=1
ai(i r) > 0 for any perturbation
(a1;    ;aN) 6= 0
Appendix C: The proof of Proposition 3
(i) The stability condition in the original N -country system:
QN =
0BBBBBB@
r1c   fkkN  fkkN        fkkN
 fkk
N
r2c   fkkN
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . . rN 1c   fkkN  fkkN
 fkk
N
       fkk
N
rNc   fkkN
1CCCCCCA is posi-
tive denite
(ii) The stability condition in the augmented (N + 1)-country system:
QN+1 =
0BBBBBBBBB@
r1c   fkkN+1   fkkN+1            fkkN+1
  fkk
N+1
r2c   fkkN+1
...
...
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . rN 1c   fkkN+1
...
... rNc   fkkN+1   fkkN+1
  fkk
N+1
           fkk
N+1
rN+1c   fkkN+1
1CCCCCCCCCA
is positive denite.
(iii) The principal minor conditions for countries 1;    ; N in the aug-
mented (N + 1)-country system:
~QN+1(N) =
0BBBBBB@
r1c   fkkN+1   fkkN+1         fkkN+1
  fkk
N+1
r2c   fkkN+1
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . . rN 1c   fkkN+1   fkkN+1
  fkk
N+1
        fkk
N+1
rNc   fkkN+1
1CCCCCCA
is positive denite.
Lemma C.1: (iii)!(i) is valid, but the reverse is not valid.
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Proof : ~QN+1(N) = QN   fkk

1
N
  1
N + 1
0B@ 1    1... . . . ...
1    1
1CA, and hence
x0 ~QN+1(N)x = x0QNx +

 fkk

1
N
  1
N + 1
 
Ni=1xi
2
(where x =
(x1;    ; xN)0).
Noting that  fkk

1
N
  1
N + 1

> 0, x0 ~QN+1(N)x > 0 8x 6= 0 !
x0QNx > 0 8x 6= 0.
Lemma C.2: (ii)!(iii) is valid, but the reverse is not valid.
(This lemma is apparent, because ~QN+1(N) is the principal submatrix of
QN .)
From Lemmas C.1 and C.2, (ii)!(i) is valid, but the reverse is not valid.
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